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Abstract
Experiments can be used to relax technical assumptions that are made by neces-
sity in theoretical analysis, and further test the robustness of theoretical predictions.
To illustrate this point we conduct a three-person bargaining experiment examining
the effect of different decision rules (unanimity and majority rule). Our experiment
implements the substantive assumptions of the Baron-Ferejohn model but imposes
no structure on the timing of proposals and votes. We compare our results to those
obtained from an earlier experiment which implemented the specific procedural as-
sumptions of the model. Our results are in many ways very similar to those from
the more structured experiment: we find that most games end with the formation
of a minimum winning coalition, and unanimity rule is associated with greater delay.
However, the earlier finding of “proposer power” is reversed. While some important
patterns are robust to the less stringent implementation of procedural assumptions,
our less structured experiment provides new insights into how multilateral bargaining
may play out in real world environments with no strict procedural rules on timing of
offers and agreements.
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1 Introduction
In economic theory assumptions are often made for technical reasons, not to reflect the
environment of interest but for tractability in finding equilibria, or simply because some
order of moves must be assumed in order to write down a non-cooperative model. Ex-
perimental economists typically implement these assumptions faithfully in the laboratory.
However, experiments allow for more flexibility as subjects can be left to interact in a less
structured way and determine the order of moves themselves. We argue that when the
object of interest is a real world environment rather than the theoretical model itself, it is
valuable to relax purely technical assumptions as a step towards external validity. Given
that the predictions of theory are assumed to say something about a reality where the
assumptions of a model are clearly not met, these predictions should also be useful for
generating hypotheses in a laboratory experiment, even if it is not a faithful implementa-
tion.
In this paper we illustrate this point in an experiment on multilateral bargaining, an en-
vironment where the order of moves in real world applications is often not clearly defined,
but a great deal of structure must be imposed in theoretical models to generate equilib-
rium predictions. In particular, we run an experiment which implements the substantive,
but not technical assumptions, of the Baron-Ferejohn model, comparing outcomes under
majority and unanimity rule. Hypotheses are derived from the theoretical model and an
earlier experiment which faithfully implemented the theoretical model, and we compare
the results from the different experimental approaches.1
A large literature on multilateral bargaining investigates situations where three or more
agents must reach an agreement on the division of some surplus. Areas of application in-
clude dividing profits from a joint enterprise, assigning government ministries to members
1The question naturally arises, “why not derive predictions from a non-cooperative model of unstruc-
tured bargaining?” While some progress has been made in studying non-cooperative models of continuous
time bargaining, these cannot be solved without replacing procedural assumptions with assumptions about
the rate at which proposals can be altered (“waiting time”) or responded to (“reaction time”) which are
critical to determining equilibria (Perry and Reny, 1993) (we note here that the that assumption made in
de Groot Ruiz et al. (2016) that the reaction time is less than the waiting time does not appear to be met
in our experiment, where often subjects attempt to agree to a proposal which has just been withdrawn).
A more serious problem is multiplicity of equilibria: continuous time multilateral bargaining allows such
strategic flexibility that the set of possible divisions is not usefully reduced by subgame perfection or other
commonly used equilibrium refinements (de Groot Ruiz et al., 2016).
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of a ruling coalition, and so on. Especially in the political context, one important question
is how alternative decision rules (e.g. majority or unanimity rule) impact the process
and outcome of such negotiations. Such questions have been addressed both theoretically,
empirically using naturally occurring data, and experimentally by having subjects bargain
in a laboratory setting.
Most recent theoretical work in this area analyses non-cooperative models. Each such
model is characterized by a specific set of procedural assumptions which specify which
players may take which actions at specific points in time.2 Perhaps the most prominent
example is the random-proposer model originally developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
(henceforth: BF model). This model is described in more detail below.
Most recent experiments on multilateral bargaining are designed so as to faithfully im-
plement, as much as possible, such non-cooperative models within the laboratory. For
example, a large number of experiments have implemented the BF model using computer
programs which randomly select a proposer, allow that subject to enter a proposal, and
then allow all subjects to vote, etc. Examples include Agranov and Tergiman (2014);
Frechette et al. (2003); Miller and Vanberg (2013, 2015). Such experiments have produced
important insights into how well predictions based on equilibrium analysis can capture the
behaviour of ‘real people’ when they are placed into a strategic environment that matches
the corresponding model. For example, experiments implementing the Baron and Fere-
john model have shown that most, but not all, of the qualitative predictions of stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) are supported.
Although it is common for such experiments to be motivated as tests of a model, a more
accurate statement may be that what is being tested is not the model itself, but the
validity of the equilibrium analysis, or of specific equilibrium concepts. For example,
when an experiment implementing the BF bargaining model is conducted, the hypothesis
being tested is not that this model is a good model of ‘real-world’ bargaining processes,
but that ‘real people’ behave according to equilibrium predictions when they are placed
2Cooperative bargaining theories (Aumann and Maschler, 1961; Davis and Maschler, 1965; Nash, 1953;
Shapley, 1952; Schmeidler, 1969) deliberately refrain from making specific procedural assumptions. Instead
they investigate the implications of axioms characterizing plausible, stable, or desirable outcomes. As they
are independent of procedural assumptions, the corresponding ‘predictions’ may be applicable to a large
set of situations.
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in an environment that matches the model by construction. To the extent that this is the
research goal, it is appropriate to faithfully implement the exact strategic environment
assumed in a model. This way, observed deviations from (or ‘confirmation’ of) equilibrium
predictions could be clearly attributed to the failure (or not) of the hypothesis that ‘real’
subjects pursue equilibrium strategies.
Many experiments are conducted with a different goal in mind. For example, many re-
searchers are interested in testing hypotheses about the effects of certain environmental
or institutional factors on bargaining behavior and outcomes. Thus, Miller and Vanberg
(2013) (henceforth: MV) investigate the effects of alternative voting rules (unanimity and
majority rule) on coalition formation and delay in reaching agreement. In such instances,
the specific bargaining model being implemented in the laboratory is used as a kind of
“workhorse” - a simple and controlled context within which a single factor can be ma-
nipulated in order to identify causal effects. Indeed, the hypotheses being tested in such
experiments may not be based on an equilibrium analysis of the corresponding model. The
hope is that effects observed within such experiments will reflect those that would occur in
‘real world’ situations to which that analysis would not strictly apply. For example, MV
are ultimately interested in the effects of voting rules on bargaining in real-world decision
making bodies such as legislatures. Although their experimental design implements a BF
game, their main hypotheses (differences in delay between treatments) are not based on
an equilibrium analysis.
For experiments of the latter type, an important question concerns the external validity
of the treatment effects observed (or not). To what extent do such effects extend to the
real world settings of ultimate interest? For example, MV find that unanimity rule is
associated with greater delay in reaching agreement. This raises the question whether
that effect is specific to the particular bargaining protocol which was implemented (BF),
or does it extend to the real-world contexts which the experimental design is intended to
represent?
One of the most important ways in which real world bargaining situations differ from
those typically implemented in a laboratory experiment is that they are not as rigidly
“structured” as any non-cooperative model. Even in legislatures governed by formal pro-
cedural and voting rules, members can engage in informal bargaining activities which are
4
largely “unstructured”. Often, the formal process of proposing and voting on the floor
will happen only after such informal negotiations have been completed. None the less, the
behavior and results of such bargaining processes is likely to be affected by formal rules
such as the majority ultimately required for a proposal to pass.
In order to assess the external validity of experimental results obtained in highly struc-
tured laboratory experiments, we conduct experiments that relax this structure, while still
maintaining a controlled environment in which a single treatment factor is manipulated.
Specifically, we conduct experiments which resemble those of MV in that groups of three
individuals will be dividing an exogenously given surplus. Like in the previous experi-
ments, delay in reaching agreement is costly, as the surplus will shrink over time. And
we implement two decision rules - majority and unanimity rule. The main difference is
that while MV faithfully implement a BF bargaining protocol, we implement a far less
structured environment, allowing all three group members to make proposals and / or
agree to others’ proposals at any point in real time.
The specifics of our experimental design are described in more detail in Section 3. As will
become clear, our setting is arguably closer to the typical structured experiments than it
is to the “real world” contexts of ultimate interest. None the less, we believe that relaxing
the very rigid structure of prior experiments, while still maintaining a simple environment
with exogenous variation in a single treatment variable, can help to assess the external
validity of prior results. Our main findings are qualitatively in line with those obtained
by Miller and Vanberg (2013). Specifically, we find more delay prior to agreement in
the unanimity rule treatment than under majority rule. This suggests that the results
obtained under the structured approach extend to a context that is more similar to the
‘real world’ situations of ultimate interest.
In line with prior evidence from structured (BF) experiments, we find that subjects learn
to form “minimum wining coalitions”, leading to more inclusive outcomes under unanimity
rule. As already mentioned, we find significant delay in coming to an agreement under both
decision rules, and that this delay is greater under unanimity rule. This is of particular
interest, as it demonstrates that this delay is not driven by the constraints implied by the
specific procedure. We do not find evidence of the “proposer power” typically observed in
earlier experiments, and in fact find that those who proposed the final agreement in our
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majority rule treatment tend to receive less than their coalition partners. In addition, the
rich dataset we have collected allows us to explore the effectiveness of different bargaining
strategies used by subjects.
2 Related Literature
The most well-known non-cooperative multilateral bargaining model was developed by
Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In that model, a randomly chosen proposer suggests a division
of a fixed surplus between themselves and the other players; the proposal is voted on, and
if it receives a sufficient number of votes (depending on the voting rule) the proposal
is implemented; if the proposal fails, the value of the surplus is discounted and a new
proposer is randomly selected. This is repeated until a proposal is accepted. The main
theoretical predictions are based on properties of the unique symmetric stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium. These include that players build minimum winning coalitions, that
the proposer receives a larger share than other coalition members, and that agreement is
reached immediately. BF has become a workhorse model that has been extended in various
ways by a number of authors (see, for example, Battaglini and Coate, 2007, 2008; Battaglini
et al., 2012; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Diermeier and Merlo, 2000; Drouvelis et al.,
2010; Duggan et al., 2000; Groseclose and Snyder, 1996; Kalandrakis, 2004; Nunnari and
Zapal, 2016; Tergiman, 2015).
Many experiments have been motivated by BF, or one of its variants (see, for example,
Agranov and Tergiman, 2014; Battaglini and Palfrey, 2012; Diermeier et al., 2006; Dier-
meier and Morton, 2005; Frechette et al., 2003, 2005b,a; Kagel et al., 2010; Miller and
Vanberg, 2013, 2015). As is typical in experimental economics, these scholars faithfully
implement the non-cooperative model in the laboratory. That is, the experiments are de-
signed to mimic, as closely as possible, the precise assumptions that make up the decisions
of nature, and the strategy sets and payoffs of players that make up the non-cooperative
model.3 Among other things, this means that the random proposer rule is experimentally
implemented: one participant in the group is randomly chosen, and only this subject is
3All experiments also relax the assumptions made about theoretical decision makers. Nunnari and
Zapal (2016) consider theoretical models which differ from BF in allowing imperfect best response and
non-equilibrium behaviour.
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given the opportunity to make a proposal that round, after which all subjects vote on that
proposal, and so on.
The paper most closely related to ours is Miller and Vanberg (2013). They implement a
BF game with three players and a discount factor of δ = .9, comparing behavior under
majority and unanimity rule. Their main findings are that subjects build (after some
experience) minimum winning coalitions. The division of the surplus within coalitions is
often equal, with a slight advantage for the proposer. Finally, unanimity rule is associated
with greater delay as measured by the fraction of first round proposals that fail. As
outlined above, the aim of the current paper is to investigate whether these patterns
persist when the procedural assumptions of the BF model are relaxed.
3 Experimental Design
Our experiment implements a three-player bargaining game played in continuous time.
All subjects can propose allocations of the available surplus and signal their approval of
existing proposals at any time. The game ends when a sufficient number of participants
agree on a given division of the available surplus. We conduct two treatments, one in which
two subjects must agree (majority rule) and one in which all three must agree (unanimity
rule). As in standard BF experiments, delay is associated with costs. Specifically, the
available surplus shrinks every 10 seconds. Thus, each ten second interval is comparable
to a single bargaining round in the Baron-Ferejohn model. Within a bargaining round,
however, no restrictions are imposed on the order in which subjects can propose or respond
to proposals.
In order to enable subjects to interact flexibly and quickly, we used a simple computer
interface. Figure 1 shows two screenshots that illustrate how the interface worked. The
bargaining set was represented in the form of a two-dimensional simplex consisting of a
finite number of circles. Each circle represents a feasible allocation of the available surplus.
The allocation associated with a given circle was displayed if a subject hovered over that
circle with the mouse. At any time, subjects could individually select a circle by clicking
on it. This was immediately made visible to all subjects by highlighting the chosen circle
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Figure 1: Screen Shot. Left: The green player has selected a circle. The numbers below
the player ID’s are associated with the circle over which his mouse is hovering (cursor not
shown). Right: The blue and green players have agreed on a division. The game will end
unless one of the two players clicks elsewhere within the following 5 seconds.
with a color associated with that player (see left panel of Figure 1). Once selected, a circle
remained so unless and until the subject clicked elsewhere (either selecting another circle,
or outside of the simplex, in which case no circle would be selected by that subject). The
game ended when at least two (majority rule) or three (unanimity rule) subjects selected
the same circle and remained there for a five second ‘ratification’ period (see right panel
of Figure 1).4
The playing screen also contained information about the current size of the surplus (ini-
tially 1000 points), and the number of seconds until the surplus would be reduced (by 10%
every 10 seconds). When sufficient players had clicked on a circle, a five second count-
down appeared indicating the time until the incipient agreement would be implemented if
it remained in place (see right panel of Figure 1).
The experiment began with a tutorial which introduced subjects to the interface (see
Appendix A for details). Subsequently, subjects played 12 repetitions of either the majority
or unanimity bargaining game under a stranger-matching protocol. To increase the number
of independent observations, subjects within a session were divided into matching groups
4Payoffs depended on the available surplus at the time of initial agreement, even if the surplus had
decreased by the end of the ratification period.
8
Table 1: Breakdown of observations
matching groups
subjects size 9 size 6 repetitions games
majority rule 57 5 2 12 228
unanimity rule 48 4 2 12 192
of size 9. Due to no-shows in two of our sessions, we have four matching groups of size
6 (see Table 1 for details). One game was randomly selected for payment, with each
point exchanged for e0.03, i.e. the initial surplus was worth e30. A total of 105 subjects
participated in the experiment, earning approximately e14 on average, including a e5
payment for completing a post-experimental questionnaire. Sessions lasted around one
hour. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
at the Vienna Center for Experimental Economics in December, 2012. Subjects were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
4 Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are motivated by existing theoretical and experimental results from the
Baron-Ferejohn game. Our aim is to see which ones are robust to our less structured
bargaining process, and so we state our hypotheses based on the findings of existing work,
and discuss informally any differences we anticipate in our new environment.
In the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the closed amendment rule model
proposed in BF,5 agreement is reached in the first round for any decision rule, and outcomes
are thus efficient. MV, however, finds delay under both unanimity and majority rule, and
that it is significantly greater under unanimity. We state our hypothesis with reference to
the experimental results:
5BF also model an open amendment rule, however we focus on the closed rule as it is far more prevalent
in the literature. In fact, for our experimental parameters, there is minimal difference between the predic-
tions of the two models. The one important difference is that the open rule predicts delay under majority
rule. In this model delay occurs because of the proposer’s uncertainty over which of the other players will
be selected to approve or amend a proposal. This mechanism cannot be present in our experiment, as
either of the other players can agree or make another proposal at any time.
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Hypothesis 1 Delay: Delay will occur under both decision rules and be more pronounced
under unanimity rule.
One possible explanation for the delay observed in existing experiments is a conflict be-
tween proposer power and fairness concerns, leading to miscoordination. As our players
are perfectly symmetric, there is no justification for claiming more than an equal share.
Also, the continuous nature of play in our design should mitigate any miscoordination.
Therefore, one might expect more agreement to occur in the first round in our experiment,
under both decision rules.
In BF, when n players are required to pass a proposal, the proposer makes a positive offer
to n−1 others to form a minimum winning coalition. In all prior experiments such as MV,
subjects also tended to form minimum winning coalitions, although less than predicted
under majority rule.
Hypothesis 2 Minimum winning coalitions: Under majority rule, the surplus is divided
exclusively among two of the three participants. Under unanimity rule, all three partici-
pants receive a positive amount.
An important feature that distinguishes our setting from experiments based on the BF
game is the asymmetry caused by the random selection of a single proposer. In the BF
game, the individual randomly chosen to propose in a given round has ‘power’ for two
reasons. First, failure to agree results in the destruction of some of the available surplus
(discounting) before an alternative proposal can be considered. The smaller the discount
factor, the more the proposal has the character of an ultimatum.6 Second, the identity
of the next proposer, and the content of his counterproposal, are unknown. This further
limits the value of rejecting a proposal. MV find experimental evidence of this proposer
power, albeit not to the extent predicted by the theory.
In our game, proposals can be introduced at any time within a round (10 sec time interval),
and by any player. This means that the identity of a “proposer” arises endogenously. In
6With a discount factor of zero, the game reduces to a multi-person ultimatum game and the homo
economicus prediction is that the proposer is able to keep the entire surplus.
10
some real-world bargaining environments, especially those governed by well-defined rules
about who can make proposals and when (such as in legislatures or negotiations over the
formation of coalition governments), there may exist individuals who can be identified
as taking the role of proposer at a particular point in time. In this case there is little
comparability between proposers in the BF environment and our own. However, in more
general unstructured real-life settings, the “proposer” will only be identifiable by the fact
that they were the party who initiated a proposal. When trying to understand and explain
factors explaining real-life agreements in this context, it becomes meaningful to compare
predictions about the share of surplus obtained by the exogenously defined proposers from
theory and structured experiments, and the predictions that would come from observing
the share obtained by the endogenously arising proposers in an unstructured experiment.
As before, we state our hypothesis according to the findings of earlier work, in which
theory and structured experiments are in agreement:
Hypothesis 3 Proposer power: The player making the implemented proposal receives
more than an equal in-coaliton share of the surplus (i.e. more than 1/3 and more than
1/2 under unanimity and majority rule, respectively).
Naturally the absence of proposer power within our game suggests that
However, given the absence of structurally induced proposer power in our implementation,
one may expect more symmetric outcomes than observed in earlier experiments.
5 Results
Table 1 summarizes the structure of the data we obtained from the experiment. 57 and 48
subjects participated in the majority and unanimity rule treatments, respectively. In total,
we observe 228 and 192 games being played under the two rules, for a total of 420 games.7
7Of the 420 games we observed, only one did not end with agreement within the three minute maximum.
This game occurred in the unanimity rule treatment and in the very first period of that session. Inspecting
the data, we saw that one player in this game did not click at all during the entire 3 minutes, suggesting that
one subject was simply not participating. This unusual game is therefore excluded from the subsequent
analysis.
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Our descriptive statistics and figures treat each of these games as a single observation. All
significance tests are based on matching group averages of the relevant statistics. These
give us 7 and 6 statistically independent observations under majority and unanimity rule,
respectively.
We begin this section by testing the three main hypotheses derived from theory and struc-
tured experiments, before conducting a more exploratory analysis of individual strategies
and their relationship with outcomes.
5.1 Time to reach agreement
Figure 2 shows, for each of our treatments, the distribution of the round (i.e. 10 second
interval) in which agreement is reached. Since the available surplus shrinks by 10% at the
end of each 10 second interval, any delay greater than 10 seconds is inefficient. As can be
seen in the Figure, such delay occurs in 25% vs. 46% under majority and unanimity rule,
respectively. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, unanimity rule appears to be associated with
greater inefficient delay.
As a means of assessing the significance of this result, Table 2 presents multiple measures of
delay and efficiency. The first column compares the average time, in seconds, that expiries
before agreement is reached. The second column compares the average round (10 second
interval) of agreement. The third column compares the number of games which end within
the first 10 seconds (round 1), and the last column looks at the number of games that
end within 20 seconds (round 1 or 2). Finally, the fifth column contains the average total
payoff achieved by the group, as a fraction of the maximum available surplus.
Each one of these measures suggest that unanimity rule is associated with significantly
longer delays, and consequently lower efficiency, than majority rule. For example, 93% of
majority rule games end in agreement within the first 20 seconds, as compared to 66% of
unanimity rule games (Wilcoxon rank-sum p = 0.01). On average, 15% of the available
surplus is lost under unanimity rule, compared to 4% under majority rule (Wilcoxon rank-
sum p = 0.03). These differences persist, and even increase in significance, when we focus
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Figure 2: Time of agreement
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on the final 6 periods of the experiment (see bottom half of Table 2).8
Result 1 Delay occurs under both decision rules and is more pronounced under unanimity
rule (consistent with Hypothesis 1).
5.2 Final agreements
We now turn to characterizing the types of distributions that groups agree upon, irre-
spective of when agreement occurs. Thus, we will be pooling agreements that occurred at
different points in time (different ‘rounds’). In all tables and figures, the shares allocated
to different players are expressed as points, each of which is worth 1/12th of the surplus
at the time of agreement. (Recall that this corresponds to the way that the game was
represented to subjects.)
8If we focus on only the final three periods, all of the differences in Table 2 remain significant at p = .01,
except for the fraction ending in round 1 (z=1.67, p=0.1).
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Table 2: Delay and efficiency
average end fraction ending total
time (sec) round round = 1 round ≤ 2 payoff
All periods
majority rule 8.3 1.4 75% 93% .96
unanimity rule 24.0 3.9 54% 66% .85
z† 2.4 2.3 1.93 2.44 2.14
p-value .02 .02 .05 .01 .03
Periods 7-12
majority rule 6.8 1.3 82% 94% .97
unanimity rule 21.4 2.7 58% 69% .87
z† 2.71 2.57 2.22 2.74 2.57
p-value <.01 0.01 0.03 <0.01 0.01
† z stats and p-values reflect a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (2-sided) based on matching group
averages. (N = 6, 7 for unanimity, majority rule)
Figure 3 presents the distribution of final agreements in the form of a bubble plot within
a two-dimensional simplex. The simplex is constructed such that the origin is where the
‘proposer’, defined as the first subject to click on the finally agreed upon point, secures
the entire pie. ‘Responder’ payoffs are measured along the horizontal and vertical axes,
respectively. In order to aggregate equivalent points, responder payoffs are ordered such
that the first coordinate is always weakly larger than the second.
Several patterns are visible in these figures. First, we can see that the modal outcomes are
the three-way and two-way equal splits under unanimity and majority rule, respectively,
and these account for 90% and 50% of all observations. Second, the right panel reveals that
the preponderance of majority rule games end with the formation of a minimum winning
coalition. These patterns are remarkably similar to those observed in the comparable
structured Baron-Ferejohn experiments conducted by Miller and Vanberg (2013). (See
Figure 4.) Finally, a somewhat surprising pattern is that the allocations within minimum
winning coalitions tend to favor the included responder over the proposer. We will return
to this phenomenon in the next subsection.
Table 3 summarizes the prevalence of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs), defined as
agreements which allocate positive shares to exactly the number of subjects required to
vote ‘yes’ in order to pass a proposal. Naturally, (almost) all agreements under unanimity
14
Unanimity rule (N = 191) Majority rule (N = 228)
172 (90%) x=(4, 4, 4)
9 (5%) x=(5, 4, 3)
4 (2%) x=(4, 5, 3)
(12,0,0)
(0,0,12)
(0,12,0)
114 (50%) x=(6, 6, 0)
32 (14%) x=(4, 4, 4)
14 (6%) x=(5, 7, 0)
(12,0,0)
(0,0,12)
(0,12,0)
Figure 3: Distribution of final agreements (bubble plot). See the text for a description for
how this figure is constructed.
Unanimity rule (N = 90) Majority rule (N = 115)
71 (79%)x=(34, 33, 33)
9 (10%) x=(36, 32, 32)
4 (4%) x=(33, 34, 33)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
36 (31%) x=(60, 40, 0)
19 (17%) x=(50, 50, 0)
14 (12%)x=(34, 33, 33)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4: Distribution of final agreements in Miller and Vanberg 2013 (bubble plot). The
figure is constructed the same way as Figure 3. These data are from a standard BF game
with discount factor δ = .9.
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Table 3: Frequency of Minimum Winning Coalitions (final agreements)
All periods Periods 7-12
Majority rule 72% 83%
(165/228) (95/114)
Unanimity rule > 99% 100%
(190/191) (96/96)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 5 10 15
Experimental period
MWC MWC (M&V 2013)
3-way Equal split 3-way Equal split (M&V 2013)
Figure 5: The fraction of final agreements under majority rule that constitute minimum
winning coalitions (MWC) and equal (three-way) splits, by experimental period. The
dashed lines represent data from a prior experiment using the Baron-Ferejohn protocol
and a discount factor of δ = .9 (Miller and Vanberg 2013).
rule constitute MWCs, i.e. give positive shares to all participants.9 More interestingly,
73% of agreements under majority rule assign one player a payoff of zero. As can be seen in
Figure 5, this percentage increases from 37% in the first period to 84% in the final period
of the experiment. At the same time, the percentage of three-way equal splits declines
from initially 37% to 5%. Again, this pattern closely mirrors the one observed in the
structured experiments conducted by Miller and Vanberg (2013), also visible in Figure 5.
9The one exception was a game that went on for nearly two minutes, at which point one player, perhaps
losing patience, suggested a fifty-fifty split between the others, to which all agreed.
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Result 2 The preponderance of final agreements constitute minimum winning coalitions.
Under majority rule, the frequency of such coalitions increases over the course of the
experiment. (Consistent with Hypothesis 2.)
5.3 Proposer (dis)advantage
As noted above, an important difference between our unstructured environment and the
classic BF game is that no subject is in a privileged procedural position. That is, no subject
is exogenously given the role of ‘proposer’. Instead, all subjects can act as ‘proposers’ by
clicking on an unoccupied point within the simplex. Our conjecture (see Section 4) was
that this will lead to more equal splits being proposed and agreed upon, as compared to
experiments based on the BF game. This conjecture is confirmed by the data, although
with an unexpected twist.
As we already saw in Figure 3, the vast majority of unanimity rule games end with agree-
ment on the three-way equal split. Under majority rule, in turn, most MWC agreements
constitute 50-50 splits (69% overall, 73% when focusing on the final 6 periods). Thus our
conjecture is partially confirmed. More surprisingly, most of the remaining MWC agree-
ments allocate less than 50% to the proposer, defined as the subject who first clicked on
the agreed-upon point.
Another way to present this phenomenon is displayed in Figure 6, which presents a his-
togram of the difference between the share allocated to the proposer and the largest of
the responder shares. Under unanimity rule, that difference is zero in 91% of all cases,
and close to zero otherwise. Under majority rule, the pattern is more complex. In ap-
proximately 35% of all cases, the difference is non-zero, and in approximately 2/3 of those
cases (23% overall), it is negative. Thus, the subject who first ‘proposes’ the agreed-upon
point often receives strictly less than (at least) one of the other two players.
Result 3 The subject making the implemented proposal does not receive more than an
equal share of the surplus. Under majority rule, most unequal splits are to the disadvantage
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Figure 6: Difference between the proposer’s share and the largest responder share
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of the proposer. (Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.)
5.4 Individual Strategies
In this section we provide some exploratory analysis which examines in more detail the
types of strategies that are associated with securing a greater payoff. We focus on the
final payoffs of subjects rather than the share of the final surplus to take into account the
negative effect of delay that may be induced by particular strategies. Our analysis is at
the subject level and relates average payoffs to behaviour over the 12 games in which they
participated.
The rich variety of behaviour and possible contingent strategies means that entering into
too much detail rapidly reduces the number of observations per strategy and precludes
statistical analysis. Therefore we utilize a simple categorization: aggressive/acquiescent
clicks are clicks where the subject would receive a greater/less than equal share of the
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surplus available to a MWC (one third in unanimity rules, one half in majority rules).10
We use as explanatory variables the proportion of clicks over the 12 games that fall into
these categories. Separate variables are calculated using all clicks, only those where the
subject is clicking on a previously empty circle (proposals), and those where subjects are
agreeing to an existing proposal (acceptances). We also consider the number of times a
subject was the initial proposer to see if early offers are more important in influencing
outcomes and, in majority rules, the proportion of clicks that are consistent with seeking
a MWC (i.e. proposals on the edge of the simplex).
Unanimity Rule
Table 4 reports regressions of average payoffs on the variables described in the previous
section. A higher proportion of both aggressive and acquiescent clicks (whether based on
all clicks, or limited to proposals) is associated with significantly lower average payoffs
(as compared to clicking only on the three-way equal split). We investigate the impact
of making the first proposal, as reflected by the coefficient on the ‘firstclicks’ variable,
which measures the number of games (out of 12) in which a subject was the first to click
on the simplex. There is no evidence that clicking first under unanimity rules is either
advantageous or disadvantageous.11
Majority Rule
As can be seen in Table 5, both aggressive and acquiescent strategies are again ineffective,
associated with significantly lower payoffs (as compared to clicking on a two-way equal
split). Aggressive proposals reduce average payoffs by nearly twice as much as acquiescent
proposals. Seeking a MWC, however, appears to be an effective strategy, as a higher
10Clicks on an equal share provide the baseline in our regression analysis.
11Interestingly, detailed inspection of individual majority rules games finds some evidence in line with
the insights of the bilateral bargaining model of Abreu and Gul (2000) which involves “behavioural types”
who demand a greater share of the surplus and never give in, leading to delay as players use costly delay
to imitate these types: in 18 of the 19 games where a subject received more than one third of the available
surplus, agreement occurred in the second round or later, and in a large majority of cases subjects who
obtain the lion’s share in a game never click on a point where they would receive a third or less. See
Embrey et al. (2014) for a laboratory implementation of this model.
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Table 4: Relationship between clicking behavior and final payoffs (unanimity rule)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
clicks > 4 -8.16***
(1.88)
clicks < 4 -26.10***
(5.31)
props > 4 -3.50**
(1.09)
props < 4 -25.01***
(6.07)
accpts > 4 -17.77**
(5.00)
accpts < 4 -6.94
(5.99)
firstclicks -0.07
(0.08)
constant 32.27*** 30.67*** 30.99*** 28.69***
(0.80) (0.85) (0.92) (1.17)
R-sqr 0.446 0.279 0.425 0.002
Standard errors clustered by matching group in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the average payoff, as a percentage of the initial pie. The first 6
independent variables are defined as the fraction of all clicks (resp. all proposals,
all acceptances) that fall into the respective intervals. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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Table 5: Relationship between clicking behavior and final payoffs (majority rule)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
clicks > 6 -30.24***
(7.53)
clicks < 6 -27.87***
(3.76)
props > 6 -28.16*** -20.58**
(6.83) (6.16)
props < 6 -18.49*** -10.64*
(4.00) (4.81)
accpts > 6 -5.11
(5.89)
accpts < 6 -16.69**
(5.66)
firstclicks 1.42***
(0.27)
props on edge 17.93*** 12.22***
(3.74) (3.21)
constant 50.27*** 45.76*** 40.14*** 26.32*** 21.79*** 33.77***
(2.42) (2.27) (3.22) (1.01) (2.23) (3.52)
R-sqr 0.416 0.376 0.174 0.180 0.362 0.500
dfres 6 6 6 6 6 6
Standard errors clustered by matching group in parentheses. The dependent variable is the
average payoff, as a percentage of the initial pie. The first 6 independent variables are defined
as the fraction of all clicks (resp. all proposals, all acceptances) that fall into the respective
intervals. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
proportion of clicks on the edge of the simplex is associated with higher average payoffs.
This holds true when controlling for aggressive or acquiescent tendencies.
In contrast to unanimity rule, here it pays off to be the first proposer: the estimate implies
that a subject who clicked first in each of the 12 games would earn 17p.p. more of the initial
surplus on average, compared to a subject who never clicked first. An alternative approach
to addressing this question is to consider individual games rather than aggregating payoffs
by subject: the first subject to click earns 36% of the surplus on average, compared to
30% for those who click later (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = .02).
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
We ran an experiment which implements the substantive, but not technical, assumptions of
the Baron-Ferejohn model and tested predictions about the outcomes under majority and
unanimity rule generated both by the predictions of the original non-cooperative model
(BF) and the results of an earlier structured experiment (MV). Predictions regarding the
formation of minimum winning coalitions (from BF and MV) and greater delay under
unanimity rule (from MV) are supported. This is good news for the BF model and
experiments based on it, as it shows that the main substantive results (theoretical and
experimental) are not driven by the imposition of technical procedural rules, but reflect
robust patterns when groups make decisions using majority or unanimity rule. This is
particularly interesting with the regard to delay under unanimity rule, where a possible
reason for the delay observed in MV was exactly a clash between the exogenously imposed
proposer power and fairness norms: we show that excessive delay occurs even in a perfectly
symmetric environment.
Contrary to the theoretical predictions of BF and the experimental results of MV, in ma-
jority rule we find that the player who proposed the final division does not on average
receive the lion’s share. A possible explanation for this “proposer dis-advantage” is that
the unstructured environment induces strong competition for inclusion in a winning coali-
tion. This may force subjects to propose points that are attractive to potential coalition
partners. The pressure to do so may be especially pronounced when a coalition between
the other two subjects is already ‘pending’ (recall that agreements are finalized after a 5-
second ratification interval). If two subjects have temporarily agreed to a 50-50 split (the
most common agreement), the excluded player can only break this agreement by offering
one player more than half, resulting in a disadvantageous proposal.
More exploratory analysis of bargaining strategies show that proposing and agreeing to
equal splits among a minimum winning coalition are more profitable than seeking more,
or agreeing to less, than one’s “fair share”. Furthermore, aiming for a minimum winning
coalition and making the first proposal are advantageous strategies under majority rule.
In summary, we have shown that the experimental implementation a model without the
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technical assumptions can be useful for both demonstrating which theoretical predictions
are robust to relaxing those assumptions (and thus more likely to be of relevance in real
world environments), and generating novel hypotheses which can inform empirical work.
The assumptions of applied theory papers are seldom met in the real world, but all are
motivated by the claim that the equilibrium analysis of a simplified model has something
to say about a much more complicated reality. Yet in experimental economics a premium
is placed on faithful implementation of the model. It is a great strength of experiments
that they can relax some of the technical assumptions imposed by necessity in theoretical
analysis, and this is a strength we feel should be more often exploited. We have illustrated
this with a study of multilateral bargaining, an area where our point is of particular
relevance. However, there are many more fields where such an approach would be fruitful,
such as network formation (Teteryatnikova and Tremewan, 2015) and matching models
where the somewhat unrealistic assumption of simultaneity of moves is often imposed. We
would like to see more work following this approach, perhaps as additional treatments to
more precise implementations of theoretical models.
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A Instructions (for unanimity treatment)
Subjects received both printed and onscreen instructions.
Onscreen Instructions (1)
The first screen contained the following text:
In this experiment, participants will interact in groups of three. The interaction will be repeated a number
of times. In what follows, we will call each repetition of the interaction a “round”.
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During each round, the three members of a group will have the opportunity to distribute up to 1000 points
amongst themselves.
The points you receive will determine how much money you earn at the end of the experiment (exactly
how will be explained later, but the more points you receive, the more money you can expect to earn).
In addition to the money you earn during the interactions, you will also receive a payment for filling in a
questionnaire.
In order to help you understand exactly how the interactions work, we will now demonstrate the functioning
of the program on your screen.
There will be a short tutorial.
In the tutorial you will be shown the screen that will be used during the real rounds. How to understand
this screen and use it to interact with the other participants in your group is explained to you in the
printed instructions you have been given.
During this tutorial n
¯
o money will be awarded0
¯
. The purpose of this tutorial is only to help you understand
how the program works. You will be informed before the real interactions begin.
Please follow the printed instructions carefully. It is important to understand how the program works!
PLEASE CLICK “Begin Tutorial” IF YOU ARE READY TO BEGIN THE TUTORIAL
Printed Instructions
The following instructions were provided in hardcopy. The tutorial exercises were con-
ducted onscreen while reading the instructions.
Tutorial Stage 1: DO NOT CLICK “Move to stage 2” UNTIL YOU ARE SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, RAISE YOUR HAND AND SOMEONE WILL COME TO ASSIST
YOU.
Basics
• During this experiment, you will be interacting with other participants in groups of three.
• The participants in your group will decide how to divide a certain number of points amongst
yourselves, which will later be converted into monetary payments.
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• On your screen, you will see small circles arranged in the form of a large triangle. Each circle
represents a different way of allocating the points amongst you and the other two participants you
are interacting with in a given round.
• The corners of the triangle are labeled “You”, “Participant A”, and “Participant B”. The closer
a point is to a given corner, the more the corresponding allocation assigns to that participant.
The points in the corners correspond to allocations in which the indicated participant receives all
available points, while the others receive no points.
• If you move your mouse over a circle, the corresponding points to be allocated to each participant
are displayed in the appropriate corners of the triangle.
• Exercises:
1. Move your mouse around the triangle until you understand how the circles are arranged. (This
example assumes that there are 1000 points available)
2. Click on a point to select it (for now, do not click on the circles that are already marked).
Notice that the selected point is circled in green.
3. Click on a point outside the triangle. The green ring should disappear.
– During the real interactions, when you click on a circle this will be shown on the screens
of the two other participants you are interacting with, and it will disappear from their
screens if you click outside the triangle.
– If all three participants select the same circle continuously for 5 seconds, the available
points are allocated accordingly.
Making agreements
• During the real interactions, any of the three participants (including you) may click on any circle
at any time.
• When you click on a circle, the other two participants in your group will see this circle marked on
their screen. (On their screen you will be identified as “Participant A” or “Participant B”)
• When another participant in your group clicks on a circle on their screen, it will be marked on
your screen in the color corresponding to that participant: orange for “Participant A”, blue for
“Participant B”. You can see how this looks on your screen (note that the two coloured rings on
your screen have been selected randomly by the computer).
• Clicking on an unmarked circle is like suggesting that division.
• Clicking on a circle marked by another participant is like provisionally accepting the division they
have suggested. The offer will only be really accepted and determine the number of points earned
in that round if all three participants click on the same circle, and no one clicks elsewhere in the
following 5 seconds.
• Now you cannot form an agreement because the orange and blue rings are on different circles, and
all three (including your green circle) must be on the same circle.
• When there is a provisional agreement in place, a red dot will appear in the corresponding circle,
and the number of points that each participant would get if the provisional agreement is finalized
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is shown in red in the appropriate corner of the triangle. In addition, a clock showing the time
remaining until the agreement is finalized is displayed in red. (You can see a picture of the screen
at the end of this document.)
Points available and the time limits
• The number of points that are available to be shared depends on how long it takes to reach an
agreement.
• At the beginning of each round there will be 1000 points available in total.
• After every 10 seconds the number of points will be reduced by a factor of 9/10, i.e. if you make an
agreement in the first 10 seconds there will be 1000 points available, if you make an agreement in
the second 10 seconds there will be 900 points available, if you make an agreement in the third 10
seconds there will be 810 points available, and so on. (Points shown on the screen will be rounded
to the nearest integer.)
• Note that the number of points received depends on when the agreement was first reached. For
example, if the final agreement was first agreed upon when there were 900 points available you will
be dividing the full 900 points even if the number of points is reduced to 810 in the following 5
seconds.
• The number of points available at a given point in time will be shown at the top left of the screen.
• To the right of this you will see a countdown to tell you when the points available will be reduced.
• If there is no agreement after 3 minutes, the round will end and all the participants in your group
will earn zero points.
Tutorial Stage 2:
• When you click “Move to stage 2” two things will happen:
– Instead of being on different circles, the blue and orange rings will appear on the same ran-
domly chosen circle in the triangle.
– The clock will start and the points available will start to decrease. Don’t worry! The points
received in this tutorial will not affect how much money you earn in this experiment. Also,
you can repeat this part of the tutorial as many times as you like.
• There will be only two differences between Stage 2 of the tutorial and the real interactions:
– In the tutorial rounds the points you will receive will not affect how much money you earn.
– In the real interactions the blue and orange rings may move as the participants you are
interacting with click on different circles on their triangles.
• CLICK ON “Move to stage 2” and complete the following exercises
• Exercises:
– Watch the top line of the screen and see how the points available decrease when the “Points
reduced in seconds” reaches zero.
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– Click the blue and orange rings and see how the “Time until agreement” starts counting down
until zero, when the round will “end” and the number of points you receive is determined.
Then click “Play another tutorial round.”
– Now try clicking on the blue and orange rings then clicking on an empty circle or outside the
triangle before the 5 seconds are up. See how the “Time until agreement” starts counting
down and then disappears when you click elsewhere.
– You can now experiment with the tutorial screen as much as you like. For example, try
forming an agreement less than 5 seconds before the points available are reduced and check
how many points you are allocated.
When you have understood how the interactions work, click on “Finish tutorial.” When all participants
have finished the tutorial, the real interactions will begin.
Onscreen Instructions (2)
The final screen of the tutorial contained the following text:
You have finished the tutorial.
You will now interact 12 times with real participants.
The participants with whom you will interact will change randomly at the beginning of each round.
The other participants in your group will always be referred to on your screen as ”Participant A” and
”Participant B”, but they will not be the same people in each round.
At the end of the experiment, one of these rounds will be randomly selected and you will be paid according
to the number of points you have earned in that round, and that round only.
Each point will be worth 3 cent, so the amount of money to be distributed in the selected round in each
group is 30 Euros.
You may now ask questions about the instructions on this page and way the program works, however
please do not ask questions about strategies and divisions you or the other players may have
used, or may use in the future . These types of questions will not be answered.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and ask it quietly when an experimenter comes.
If you have no questions, please click ”Continue” and wait for the real rounds to begin.
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